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Abstract: Unbalanced bidding, also known as skewed 
bidding, is the process of increasing and/or decreasing 
the prices of various bid items without altering the total 
offered bid price. Bids can be unbalanced either mathe-
matically (front-end loading) or materially (quantity error 
exploitation). Owners should be very careful when eval-
uating the tenders as awarding a contract to an unbal-
anced bid may result in severe cost overruns because the 
prices of those items do not reflect their true costs and 
markup allocations. Unbalanced bidding is still a con-
tentious issue in the construction industry. While some 
researchers consider it as a legal bidding strategy in such 
a fierce competitive business environment, others view 
it as an unethical practice and claim that unbalanced 
bids should be disqualified. Studies regarding unbal-
anced bidding can be categorized into two groups: (1) 
the ones focusing on detecting or preventing this prac-
tice to help owners; and 2) the ones focusing on opti-
mizing unbalanced bidding to help contractors. This 
study aims to develop a model, which consists of eight 
grading systems, to assist owners in detecting materially 
unbalanced bids. The proposed model is the improved 
version of the previous model, which was composed of 
five grading systems. In order to demonstrate how this 
grading-based model can be used by owners, an illustra-
tive example is presented. It was found that owners can 
easily and successfully detect unbalanced bids via the 
proposed model.
Keywords: unbalanced bidding, materially unbalanced 
bids, detection model, owners
1  Introduction
In the construction industry, owners may select contrac-
tors through competitive bidding or direct negotiation. 
However, competitive bidding has long been used as a 
prevalent method for awarding contracts, especially in 
public projects. Therefore, it is commonly acknowledged 
that the success of construction projects and the business 
continuity of contractors are mainly dependent on compa-
nies’ robust bidding strategies (Ahmed et al. 2016).
A bid price mainly consists of three components, 
namely, direct cost, indirect cost, and a bid markup, which 
is the sum of general overhead, profit, and contingency 
in percentage (Dikmen et al. 2007). Since owners tend to 
select contractors on the basis of the price, contractors 
should be very conscientious when determining their bid 
price. Contractors should thoroughly calculate the costs of 
work items and estimate the bid markup considering their 
bidding strategy and the contract type that will be used.
Unbalanced bidding, also known as skewed bidding, 
can be defined as the process of increasing the prices of 
some items and concurrently decreasing the prices of 
other items without affecting the total offered bid price, 
with the intention of achieving competitive advantage 
over rivals and thereby increasing the chance of winning 
the contract, minimizing the total project cost, improv-
ing cash flow, and increasing the profit of the project 
(Cattell et al. 2007; Afshar and Amiri 2010a; Skitmore and 
Cattell 2013; Hyari 2016; Hyari et al. 2016; Nikpour et al. 
2017; An et al. 2018; Aziz and Aboelmagd 2019). Although 
this practice can be used by contractors when they are 
bidding lump sum or unit price contracts (e.g., Su and 
Lucko 2015; Hyari 2016; Hyari et al. 2016; Hyari 2017; 
Nikpour et al. 2017), it is predominantly used in unit 
price contracts as the actual quantity is not known for 
certain (e.g., Hoogenboom et al. 2006; Arditi and Choti-
bhongs 2009; Mandell and Nyström 2011; Nyström 2015; 
An et al. 2018).
In lump sum contracts, the contractor offers a fixed 
price to the owner to perform all the work items within 
the scope of the project. This type of contract is commonly 
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used for projects in which the scope is clearly defined and 
the quantities of work items can be accurately estimated 
by the owners during the bidding process (Carty 1995; 
Gransberg and Riemer 2009). Payments to the contrac-
tors are made based on a percentage of work completed 
(Poage 2000). Lump sum contract is very risky for the 
contractor, whereas it offers the owner the best protection 
against potential cost overruns (Carty 1995; Gransberg 
and Riemer 2009).
On the other hand, unit price contracts are utilized 
where the scope of work cannot clearly be defined and 
the quantities of work items cannot be accurately calcu-
lated by the owners during the bidding stage (Gransberg 
and Riemer 2009). In general, owners provide the esti-
mated bill of quantities of work items, and the candidates 
offer not only the total bid price but also the unit price 
for each item (Cattell et al. 2010; Cattell 2012; Nyström 
and Mandell 2019). Payments to the contractors are made 
based on actual quantities of the performed work rather 
than the estimated quantities (Hyari et al. 2017). Actual 
quantities mostly deviate from the estimated quantities, 
which – in turn – affects the total project cost and the 
contractor’s profitability (Gransberg and Riemer 2009; 
Afshar and Amiri 2010b; Bajari et al. 2014; Hyari et al. 
2017). This type of contracting system promises several 
advantages, such as relatively low transaction cost and 
transparency. On the other hand, it has some drawbacks, 
such as lack of incentives for innovation and the poten-
tial for receiving unbalanced bids (Nyström and Mandell 
2019). This type of contract is widespread in projects 
involving heavy construction, such as highways, bridges, 
dams, pipelines, and so on, and is predominantly pre-
ferred by public agencies (Carty 1995; Poage 2000).
There are two main categories of unbalanced bids, 
namely, mathematically unbalanced bids and materi-
ally unbalanced bids. While mathematically unbalanced 
bids refer to the bids in which the markup is not propor-
tionately allocated to each bid item’s price, materially 
unbalanced bids refer to the bids in which not only is the 
markup not proportionately allocated, but the actual costs 
of some activities are also manipulated (Christodoulou 
2008; Arditi and Chotibhongs 2009; Su and Lucko 2015).
Bids can be unbalanced mathematically via front-end 
loading or back-end loading, and they can be unbalanced 
materially via quantity error exploitation (Cattell et al. 
2007; Cattell et al. 2008). Contractors may decide to use 
one or more of these unbalancing forms depending on 
their motivation.
When a contractor inflates the unit prices of the bid 
items scheduled to start in the early phases of the project 
and simultaneously deflates the unit prices of the bid 
items scheduled to start in the later phases, the contrac-
tor will receive larger amounts of money for the first few 
progress payments. This type of price manipulation may 
likely reduce the financing cost of the project and thereby 
improve the contractor’s cash flow when the value of time 
is considered (Wang 2004; Son et al. 2006; Cattell et al. 
2008; Peterson 2009; Su and Lucko 2015; Nikpour et al. 
2017). This form of unbalancing is named as “front-end 
loading” (Cattell et al. 2007).
Contrary to front-end loading, the practice of overpric-
ing the items scheduled to start in the late phases of the 
project, along with underpricing the items scheduled to 
start in the early phases, is named as “back-end loading” 
(Cattell et al. 2007; Cattell et al. 2008; Su and Lucko 2015). 
This form of unbalancing is preferred by contractors who 
undertake long-duration projects in high-inflation-rate 
countries because of the fact that they can receive larger 
amounts of escalation in compensation for inflation 
(Nikpour et al. 2017; Cattell et al. 2008; Arditi and Chotib-
hongs 2009). Since the main idea behind mathematically 
unbalanced bids is improving the contractor’s cash flow, 
they are also named as “cash flow unbalancing” (Hyari et 
al. 2016).
If a contractor detects mistakes in the quantities of 
some items estimated by the owner and/or predicts that 
the quantities of some items may considerably increase 
due to potential design changes, the contractor may tend 
to allocate higher prices to these items and simultane-
ously allocate lower prices to those items whose quanti-
ties are expected to be reduced (Cattell et al. 2007; Cattell 
et al. 2008; Su and Lucko 2015; Prajapati and Bhavsar 
2017). In this type of unbalancing, contractors take advan-
tage of the potential mistakes made by the owner in the 
quantities of some bid items and/or vagueness in design 
documents and, thereby, substantially increases their 
profit (Hyari 2016). This form of unbalancing is known as 
“quantity error exploitation” or “individual rate loading” 
(Cattell et al. 2007; Cattell et al. 2008; Su and Lucko 2015; 
Amusan et al. 2018).
Unbalanced bidding is still one of the most conten-
tious issues in the construction industry. While some 
researchers deal with unbalanced bidding from the con-
tractors’ perspective and consider it as a legal bidding 
strategy in such a fierce competitive business environ-
ment, others tackle this practice from the owners’ per-
spective and view it as an unethical practice and claim 
that, especially, materially unbalanced bids should be 
disqualified (Kenley 2003; Su and Lucko 2015).
Studies in the construction management literature 
and practice regarding unbalanced bidding can be cate-
gorized into two groups: (1) the ones focusing on detecting 
2074   Polat et al., Model for detecting unbalanced bids
or preventing this practice, aiming to help owners (e.g., 
Bell 1989; Wang 2004; Arditi and Chotibhongs 2009; 
Shrestha et al. 2012; Hyari 2016; Hyari et al. 2016; Nikpour 
et al. 2017; An et al. 2018; Polat et al. 2019); and (2) the 
ones focusing on optimizing unbalanced bidding, 
which aim to help contractors (e.g., Yizhe and Youjie 
1992; Nassar 2004; Son et al. 2006; Cattell et al. 2008; 
Christodoulou 2008; Liu et al. 2009; Afshar and Amiri 
2010a, 2010b; Mandell and Nyström 2011; Cattell et al. 
2011; Bajari et al. 2014).
This study deals with the detection of unbalanced bids 
created by quantity error exploitation in unit price con-
tracts. For this purpose, after reviewing existing models 
in the literature, an advanced model for the detection 
of unbalanced bids is proposed by improving the model 
formerly developed by Polat et al. (2019). The proposed 
model uses eight different grading systems for detection 
of unbalanced bids, whereas the previous model con-
sisted of five grading systems. Owners may assign dif-
ferent weights to these grading systems according to the 
characteristics of their projects. After assigning weights to 
the grading systems, the final scores of each bidder can be 
calculated. All bidders can be evaluated not only accord-
ing to their bid prices but also according to the calculated 
final scores. An illustrative example is presented to check 
the applicability of the proposed model in construction 
projects. The findings of this study indicate that the pro-
posed model provides a marked improvement compared 
to the previous model. It also provides owners with a new 
perspective in detecting unbalanced bids during the bid 
evaluation phase.
2   Literature review: previous 
models for unbalanced bid 
detection
Unbalanced bids may cause owners to overpay, increase 
the risk of contractor default, demotivate the contractor 
for completing the project, complicate the valuation of 
changes during the construction phase, create unfair 
competition environment, and bring about delays, which 
in turn negatively affect the project’s overall performance 
(Manzo and Tell 1997; Yin et al. 2010; Kenley 2003; Hyari 
2017). Therefore, owners desire to detect unbalanced bids 
in advance in order to shield themselves from the poten-
tial adverse outcomes. In general, unbalanced bidding is 
not outlawed in the construction industry, but it is seen as 
an unethical and risky strategy. Detecting mathematically 
(front-end loading or back-end loading) unbalanced bids 
is relatively easier than detecting materially unbalanced 
bids (quantity error exploitation) (Cattell et al. 2007; 
Su and Lucko 2015; Nikpour et al. 2017). Therefore, most 
of the previous research has focused on detecting mathe-
matically unbalanced bids.
Bell (1989) developed a single percentage factor 
method, which precludes materially and mathematically 
unbalanced bids in unit price contracts. Wang (2004) 
proposed a procedure to handle unbalancing in lump 
sum contracts. This method mainly concentrates on the 
adjustment of rates in the estimated quantities submitted 
by the lowest bidder and the rates submitted by all qual-
ified bidders. Arditi and Chotibhongs (2009) developed 
two different models to detect unbalanced bids created 
by front-end loading and quantity error exploitation. 
The main idea behind these models is the comparison of 
prices of each bid item with the owner’s estimates and 
the average prices offered by all bidders. Shrestha et al. 
(2012) proposed to conduct linear correlation analysis in 
order to find out whether bids are mathematically unbal-
anced or not. Hyari (2016) developed an unbalanced bid 
prevention model, which uses the average unit price of 
all bidders to adjust unit price of every bid item submit-
ted by each bidder. Hyari et al. (2016) provided owners 
with an unbalanced bid detection model, which takes 
into account uncertainty in estimated quantities of bid 
items and uses Monte Carlo simulation to measure the 
risk impacts of differences between actual and estimated 
quantities of bid items. Nikpour et al. (2017) proposed a 
detection tool, which develops a Bid Markup Distribution 
Index (BMDI) graph, to identify unbalanced bids in unit 
price contracts during the bid evaluation process. The 
developed tool also uses Monte Carlo simulation to con-
sider the impacts of cost uncertainties and risks. Nikpour 
et al. (2017) developed an unbalanced bid detection tool, 
which is based on BMDI graph and uses Monte Carlo 
simulation, for the purpose of identifying unbalanced 
bids in unit price contracts and considering the impacts 
of cost uncertainties and risks during the bid evaluation 
process. An et al. (2018) developed an unascertained 
model, which uses the owner’s estimated price as eval-
uation criterion and identifies unbalanced bids. Polat et 
al. (2019) proposed an unbalanced bid detection model, 
which contains five different grading systems and aims 
to assist owners in detecting unbalanced bids. The pro-
posed model enables owners to calculate the individual 
grades of each bidder or calculate the final score of each 
bidder by assigning different weights to these grading 
systems according to the project characteristics or their 
own needs.
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3   The improved grading-based 
model for unbalanced bid 
detection
The objectives of this study include the following: (1) 
defining new grading systems to extend the existing 
approach in detection of unbalanced bids; and (2) vali-
dating the new grading systems through an illustrative 
example. In order to achieve these objectives, the model 
formerly developed by Polat et al. (2019), which consisted 
of five grading systems, was modified by adding three new 
grading systems.
In the model of Polat et al. (2019), the first grading 
system compares the ratio of each activity’s total price 
in the bid price offered by each bidder with the one 
estimated by the owner, the second grading system 
compares the unit price of each activity offered by each 
bidder with the ones estimated by the owner, the third 
grading system compares the unit price of each activity 
offered by each bidder with the average of unit prices 
offered by all bidders, the fourth grading system com-
pares the bid price offered by the bidder with the esti-
mated construction cost (ECC), and the fifth grading 
system compares the sum of total prices offered by 
bidders for those activities whose quantities may likely 
increase during the construction phase with the ones 
estimated by the owner.
In this study, major and minor bid items have been 
defined. If a bid item’s total price is ≥5% of the owner’s 
ECC, this bid item is called as a “major bid item”. On the 
other hand, if a bid item’s total price is <5% of the ECC, 
this bid item is called as a “minor bid item”.
Polat et al. (2019) described five grading systems 
for detection of unbalanced bids in detail. For a thor-
ough description of the five grading systems, readers are 
directed to Polat et al. (2019). The modified approach pro-
posed in this study adopts the same grading systems used 
by Polat et al. (2019), but the following grading systems 
are added for the detection of unbalanced bids.
3.1  Sixth grading system
The main idea behind this grading system is to compare 
the unit price (bupimjkl) of each major activity imjk (k = 1, 
2, …, K) offered by each bidder l with the ones estimated 
by the owner (oupimjk). First, the major activities (imj) whose 
total price is ≥5% of the ECC are determined. Then, the 
sixth comparison ratio (r6kl) for the kth major activity and 








where r6kl is the sixth comparison ratio for the kth major 
activity and the lth bidder, bupimjkl is the unit price of the 
kth major activity offered by the lth bidder, and oupimjk is 
the unit price of the kth major activity estimated by the 
owner.
Each bidder l receives a grade for each major activity 
(g6imjkl) according to the value of the sixth comparison ratio 
(r6kl) based on the intervals given in Table 1, which was 
formerly used by Polat et al. (2019) for the grading systems 
1, 2, 3, and 5 and is now used for the new grading systems 
6, 7, and 8. Then, the total score of the lth bidder received 
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where BPl is the total bid price offered by the lth bidder, 
bupli is the unit price of the ith activity offered by the lth 
Tab. 1: Grade values for grading systems 6, 7, and 8 
 Comparison ratio Grade  Comparison ratio Grade
r ≤ 0.9 42 1.005 < r ≤ 1.010 20
0.900 < r ≤ 0.905 41 1.010 < r ≤ 1.015 19
0.905 < r ≤ 0.910 40 1.015 < r ≤ 1.020 18
0.910 < r ≤ 0.915 39 1.020 < r ≤ 1.025 17
0.915 < r ≤ 0.920 38 1.025 < r ≤ 1.030 16
0.920 < r ≤ 0.925 37 1.030 < r ≤ 1.035 15
0.925 < r ≤ 0.930 36 1.035 < r ≤ 1.040 14
0.930 < r ≤ 0.935 35 1.040 < r ≤ 1.045 13
0.935 < r ≤ 0.940 34 1.045 < r ≤ 1.050 12
0.940 < r ≤ 0.945 33 1.050 < r ≤ 1.055 11
0.945 < r ≤ 0.950 32 1.055 < r ≤ 1.060 10
0.950 < r ≤ 0.955 31 1.060 < r ≤ 1.065 9
0.955 < r ≤ 0.960 30 1.065 < r ≤ 1.070 8
0.960 < r ≤ 0.965 29 1.070 < r ≤ 1.075 7
0.965 < r ≤ 0.970 28 1.075 < r ≤ 1.080 6
0.970 < r ≤ 0.975 27 1.080 < r ≤ 1.085 5
0.975 < r ≤ 0.980 26 1.085 < r ≤ 1.090 4
0.980 < r ≤ 0.985 25 1.090 < r ≤ 1.095 3
0.985 < r ≤ 0.990 24 1.095 < r ≤ 1.100 2
0.990 < r ≤ 0.995 23 1.100 < r 1
0.995 < r ≤ 1.000 22
1.000 < r ≤ 1.005 21
Source: Polat et al. (2019).
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where brimjkl is the ratio of the kth major activity esti-
mated by the lth bidder in his total bid price BPl, bupimjkl 
is the unit price of the kth major activity offered by the lth 
bidder, qimjk is the quantity of the kth major activity, and 
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where ECC is the estimated construction cost, oupi is 
the unit price of the ith activity, and qi is the quantity of 









where orimjk is the ratio of the kth major activity esti-
mated by the owner in the ECC, oupimjk is the unit price 
of the kth major activity estimated by the owner, qimjk is 

























where BTS6l is the total score of the lth bidder received 
from the sixth grading system, brimjkl is the ratio of the 
kth major activity estimated by the lth bidder in his total 
bid price BPl, g6imjkl is the grade received by each bidder 
l for the kth major activity according to the value of the 
sixth comparison ratio (r6kl) based on the intervals 
given in Table 1, orimjk is the ratio of the kth major activity 
estimated by the owner in the estimated construction 
cost ECC, and gmax is the maximum value of the sixth 
grading system, which is equal to 42.
3.2  Seventh grading system
The main idea behind this grading system is to compare 
the unit price of the kth major activity offered by the 
lth bidder (bupimjkl) with the average of the unit prices 
offered by all bidders for the kth major activity (aupimjk). 
The average unit price of the kth major activity (aupimjk) 
and the seventh comparison ratio (r7kl) for the kth major 
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where aupimjk is the average of the unit prices offered by all 
bidders for the kth major activity, bupimjkl is the unit price of 









where r7kl is the seventh comparison ratio for the kth major 
activity and the lth bidder, bupimjkl is the unit price of the kth 
major activity offered by the lth bidder, and aupimjk is the 
average of the unit prices offered by all bidders for the kth 
major activity.
Each bidder l receives a grade for each major activity 
(g7imjkl) according to the value of the seventh comparison 
ratio (r7kl) based on the intervals given in Table 1 and then the 
total score of the lth bidder received from the seventh grading 
























where BTS7l is the total score of the lth bidder received from 
the seventh grading system, brimjkl is the ratio of the kth major 
activity estimated by the lth bidder in his total bid price BPl, 
g7imjkl is the grade received by each bidder l for the kth major 
activity according to the value of the seventh comparison 
ratio (r7kl) based on the intervals given in Table 1, orimjk is the 
ratio of the kth major activity estimated by the owner in the 
ECC, and gmax is the maximum value of the seventh grading 
system, which equals 42.
3.3  Eighth grading system
The main idea behind this grading system is to compare the 
ratio of the sum of all major activities’ total prices offered by 
the lth bidder (sbrimjkl) to that of minor activities (sbrimnpl) on 
the one hand with the ones (sorimjk, sorimnp) estimated by the 
owner on the other. First the minor activities (imnp) (p = 1, 2, 
3, …, P) whose total price is <5% of the ECC are determined. 
Then, the eighth comparison ratio (r8l) for the lth bidder is 
calculated using Equations 10–12.























where sbrimjkl is the sum of the major activities’ prices 
offered by the lth bidder, bupimjkl is the unit price of the 
kth major activity offered by the lth bidder, qimjk is the 
quantity of the kth major activity, sbrimnpl is the sum of 
the minor activities’ prices offered by the lth bidder, 
bupimnpl is the unit price of the pth minor activity offered 
























where sorimjk is the sum of the major activities’ prices esti-
mated by the owner, oupimjk is the unit price of the kth major 
activity estimated by the owner, qimjk is the quantity of the 
kth major activity, sorimnp is the sum of the minor activities’ 
prices estimated by the owner, oupimnp is the unit price of 
the pth minor activity estimated by the owner, and qimnp is 
the quantity of the pth minor activity.
Then, the eighth comparison ratio (r8l) is 












where r8l is the eighth comparison ratio for the lth bidder, 
sbrimjkl is the sum of the major activities’ prices offered by 
the lth bidder, sbrimnpl is the sum of the minor activities’ 
prices offered by the lth bidder, sorimjk is the sum of the 
major activities’ prices estimated by the owner, and sorimnp 
is the sum of the minor activities’ prices estimated by the 
owner.
Each bidder l receives a grade for each major activ-
ity (g8l) according to the value of the eighth compari-
son ratio (r8l) based on the intervals given in Table 1, 
and then the total score of the lth bidder received from 
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where BTS8l is the total score of the lth bidder received from 
the eighth grading system, g8l is the grade received by 
each bidder l according to the value of the eighth compar-
ison ratio (r8l) based on the intervals given in Table 1, and 
gmax is the maximum value of the eighth grading system, 
which equals 42.
For all grading systems, a comparison rate is calcu-
lated. Bidders receive grades depending on these ratios. 
The grading table (Table 1) allows the owner to evaluate 
the bidders objectively. In grading systems 6, 7, and 8, a 
comparison rate that is >1.050 corresponds to the lowest 
grade (gmin =1), whereas a comparison rate <0.950 corre-
sponds to the highest grade (gmax =42). Finally, each bid-
der’s final score can be calculated by assigning weights 
to each grading system according to a preferred criterion 
(Equation 14). The evaluation of the bidders will be based 
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where wj is the weight for the jth grading system and BTSlj is 
the total score of the lth bidder according to the jth grading 
system.
4  Illustrative example
An illustrative example used by Polat et al. (2019) is 
presented to validate the applicability of the proposed 
model in construction projects. The presented example 
comprises 72 activities; five out of these 72 activities are 
identified as “major activities”, while others are identified 
as “minor activities”. The unit price of each activity esti-
mated by the owner are taken from “The Construction and 
Installation Unit Prices Book”, published by the Turkish 
Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning. The units, 
quantities, and unit prices of these 72 activities, as esti-
mated by the owner (O) and offered by eight bidders (B), 
are presented in Table 2.
The ECC provided by the owner is 13,766,619.41 TL, and 
the bid prices offered by the eight bidders are 14,043,276.86 
TL (BP1), 13,826,569.14 TL (BP2), 13,389,997.59 TL (BP3), 
13,624,850.19 TL (BP4), 13,947,114.50 TL (BP5), 13,622,893.85 
TL (BP6), 13,641,083.17 TL (BP7), and 13,538,572.61 TL (BP8), 
respectively.
The weights assigned to the grading systems by Polat 
et al. (2019) were 20% for the first grading system, 15% 
for the second one, 10% for the third one, 15% for the 
fourth one, and 40% for the fifth one. In this study, dif-
ferent weights are assigned due to the addition of three 
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Tab. 2: Input data for illustrative example
Activity 
ID Unit Quantity
Unit prices (in TL [Turkish Liras])
O B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
A1 m3 700 14.38 14.75 13.07 15.50 15.56 14.92 13.64 14.88 14.66 
A2 m3 365 38.83 41.91 41.25 42.38 35.58 41.11 38.14 40.41 36.32 
A3 m3 850 2.84 3.08 2.59 2.96 2.63 2.98 2.84 2.86 2.68 
A4 m3 736 4.83 5.29 4.57 5.27 5.15 4.36 4.46 4.62 4.72 
A5 M 198 67.70 65.94 63.94 74.14 65.43 69.76 68.75 69.39 62.33 
A6 m3 59 31.88 29.82 28.96 29.66 29.41 33.12 29.21 28.89 29.34 
A7 m3 150 14.19 13.60 13.21 14.34 13.67 13.78 15.17 13.64 15.11 
A8 m3 90 29.19 26.97 28.68 29.95 31.42 30.40 31.12 29.52 30.38 
A9 m3 2000 178.63 170.44 183.53 173.77 166.04 189.94 187.99 175.84 169.66 
A10 M 1200 335.43 330.84 362.48 336.29 333.25 322.75 318.94 329.43 353.08 
A11 M 650 68.40 65.53 74.79 69.38 63.26 64.79 69.13 72.10 73.25 
A12 m3 350 52.20 51.26 47.00 54.89 56.72 47.53 54.14 52.51 56.04 
A13 m3 100 86.29 84.53 92.11 85.72 91.16 88.14 85.52 88.90 82.79 
A14 m3 360 121.63 112.82 133.19 131.99 130.73 122.52 128.27 111.87 124.88 
A15 M 36 29.19 29.64 28.97 30.16 27.98 28.77 31.89 29.44 27.92 
A16 M 40 33.40 35.59 34.05 32.36 36.04 35.12 36.57 32.56 36.23 
A17 m2 1000 22.18 20.98 23.41 20.95 23.78 22.35 23.19 23.00 20.95 
A18 m2 750 23.24 23.34 21.41 23.86 21.85 21.32 24.63 21.88 22.87 
A19 m2 635 31.39 32.96 31.66 29.76 30.56 32.36 28.90 29.47 33.33 
A20 m2 400 35.64 36.75 37.55 36.58 39.03 35.38 37.56 35.40 36.21 
A21 m2 348 38.05 39.78 38.77 39.28 35.44 35.79 39.19 39.63 35.08 
A22 m2 250 50.16 50.34 49.73 52.14 45.85 52.27 49.12 50.30 49.46 
A23 m2 100 26.56 26.26 27.36 26.88 25.07 24.98 27.50 24.59 27.82 
A24 m2 150 35.63 36.26 34.12 37.72 34.84 35.66 35.98 32.82 35.03 
A25 m2 75 23.61 24.87 21.25 21.81 24.29 23.15 23.41 24.72 24.89 
A26 m2 98 28.59 25.89 26.65 28.53 28.52 31.41 28.69 28.21 30.46 
A27 m2 50 27.29 27.41 25.95 29.84 26.82 28.77 25.32 25.65 24.73 
A28 m2 43 29.98 30.20 29.84 27.50 30.75 28.48 32.57 28.26 30.09 
A29 m2 66 44.61 45.92 47.46 44.67 40.65 48.92 42.76 43.53 41.53 
A30 m2 40 58.94 54.01 56.03 53.11 59.19 59.65 54.99 59.98 60.40 
A31 m2 40 39.54 43.20 42.80 39.07 37.86 38.69 42.66 41.16 39.66 
A32 m2 100 40.24 42.55 39.59 41.02 42.52 43.04 41.36 41.56 36.69 
A33 m2 450 1.94 1.75 2.08 2.01 1.94 2.00 1.99 2.01 1.75 
A34 m2 350 2.35 2.17 2.48 2.39 2.27 2.55 2.20 2.58 2.19 
A35 m2 40 16.91 15.70 15.29 15.72 16.19 15.85 15.66 16.05 17.10 
A36 m2 60 20.71 18.91 20.89 20.97 20.51 21.01 22.31 20.95 20.96 
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Activity 
ID Unit Quantity
Unit prices (in TL [Turkish Liras])
O B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
A37 m2 50 14.68 15.50 14.91 13.82 13.55 13.29 14.37 14.57 13.84 
A38 m2 1000 27.71 26.86 27.56 26.32 29.55 26.55 26.78 27.64 28.43 
A39 m2 450 43.24 39.04 46.78 45.19 46.00 43.59 45.01 45.12 47.13 
A40 m2 900 32.39 34.31 29.90 34.25 33.58 32.77 29.28 31.71 29.34 
A41 m2 650 33.90 33.90 30.71 36.87 36.48 30.83 35.46 31.94 31.03 
A42 m2 100 6.29 6.84 5.71 6.33 5.92 5.68 5.97 6.86 6.02 
A43 m2 1000 1.29 1.29 1.31 1.23 1.40 1.36 1.22 1.19 1.18 
A44 m2 150 7.33 7.01 6.67 6.64 7.45 7.91 7.12 7.29 7.64 
A45 m2 2000 11.78 11.58 12.45 11.39 11.86 12.38 11.66 12.90 12.94 
A46 m2 1600 30.04 29.74 30.87 31.84 27.61 30.66 31.46 29.77 30.38 
A47 m2 2000 29.56 30.55 30.33 30.01 32.43 28.17 30.23 29.49 27.07 
A48 m3 600 4.59 4.65 4.72 4.72 4.68 4.50 4.27 4.87 4.15 
A49 m3 450 5.84 5.36 6.42 5.29 5.88 6.11 5.41 6.06 5.64 
A50 m2 750 4.83 5.29 4.61 4.97 5.18 4.77 4.79 4.86 5.21 
A51 m2 1600 115.81 107.85 117.90 125.97 116.49 107.78 122.21 120.78 120.28 
A52 m2 650 136.51 142.73 139.82 133.89 126.59 128.11 149.12 141.47 126.39 
A53 m2 650 88.36 89.02 81.44 91.52 92.22 93.89 89.25 79.90 81.71 
A54 m2 250 123.24 133.28 134.02 112.88 133.04 134.99 119.83 131.82 114.27 
A55 m2 690 50.34 48.72 47.31 53.42 49.00 46.54 53.07 51.53 45.89 
A56 m2 600 170.88 157.50 161.31 160.47 179.91 166.13 182.67 164.95 182.67 
A57 m2 350 319.38 338.86 338.76 344.12 339.48 325.54 350.95 306.97 302.08 
A58 m2 400 250.09 261.30 253.70 264.69 249.89 244.55 265.10 264.46 226.00 
A59 ton 1300 2096.56 2127.33 2152.31 1941.54 2089.57 2077.30 2026.49 1988.62 2045.57 
A60 ton 1650 2017.94 2140.37 2143.31 1877.71 1975.24 1998.95 1887.98 2160.53 1974.92 
A61 ton 350 1972.66 1871.37 1796.76 2120.92 2169.36 1789.12 2155.85 1837.37 1987.05 
A62 ton 1000 1939.23 1985.11 1832.36 1762.37 1999.50 2115.62 2044.00 1860.08 1918.36 
A63 ton 1150 1914.79 1914.13 1780.31 2038.14 1781.33 1987.31 1875.30 1810.11 1885.75 
A64 ton 200 3386.01 3642.50 3635.81 3425.98 3236.22 3658.23 3346.48 3591.23 3238.26 
A65 Kg 4000 8.64 9.39 8.07 8.58 7.87 8.65 9.13 8.38 7.97 
A66 m2 2000 9.59 9.16 10.29 10.06 9.74 10.16 9.55 8.82 10.51 
A67 m2 600 13.00 12.96 13.32 14.30 14.00 13.68 11.84 12.36 14.07 
A68 m2 150 5.23 5.62 5.34 5.53 5.32 5.06 4.91 5.17 5.45 
A69 m2 2000 15.65 14.26 16.26 14.72 16.25 15.96 14.87 15.75 16.47 
A70 m2 2000 18.56 19.20 16.81 18.13 19.78 18.95 17.37 17.73 18.78 
A71 m2 700 28.60 27.78 27.36 26.28 31.23 30.24 27.97 27.13 28.49 
A72 m2 2000 20.88 21.98 22.75 22.95 19.38 19.91 21.36 19.67 22.51 
Source: Polat et al. (2019).
Tab. 2: Continued
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Tab. 3: Final scores of bidders
Bidder ID
Grading system number 
Final Score Ranking
1 (15%) 2 (10%) 3 (5%) 4 (10%) 5 (30%) 6 (5% 7 (5%) 8 (20%)
B1 51.35 41.16 39.12 31.82 50.00 40.19 36.59 45.24 44.84 8
B2 49.30 47.62 45.27 50.00 66.67 51.24 47.13 69.05 58.15 1
B3 49.52 62.05 59.75 77.27 2.38 66.41 62.42 76.19 46.74 6
B4 50.73 55.00 53.22 63.64 54.76 54.74 51.55 50.00 53.88 4
B5 50.23 43.29 42.19 40.91 42.86 43.47 41.00 52.38 45.62 7
B6 49.74 54.88 53.38 63.64 52.38 57.57 54.73 64.29 56.17 3
B7 49.59 53.83 52.26 59.09 38.10 55.75 52.74 61.90 50.58 5
B8 50.35 58.99 57.40 68.18 61.90 59.61 56.58 52.38 58.00 2
new grading systems to the proposed model. An expert, 
who works as a contracting engineer in a public agency 
and is responsible for evaluating whether the proposed 
bids are balanced or not, was consulted, and weights 
were assigned to the developed grading systems based 
on his opinion and experience. In this study, weights 
were assigned as 15% for first grading system, 10% for 
the second one, 5% for the third one, 10% for the fourth 
one, 30% for the fifth one, 5% for the sixth one, 5% for the 
seventh one, and 20% for the eighth one. The owner can 
assign different weights to the grading systems according 
to the project characteristics. The final scores calculated 
for the eight bidders are presented in Table 3.
Based on the results presented in Table 3, Bidder 
2 (B2) has the highest final score, whereas Bidder 1 (B1) 
has the lowest final score. Although B3 offered the lowest 
bid price, it is ranked sixth according to the final scores. 
Moreover, B1 has the lowest final score while offering 
the highest bid price. Finally, B1 submits the highest bid 
price and the most unbalanced bid, whereas B2 submits 
the most balanced bid despite not offering the lowest bid 
price. In other words, B2 is the most appropriate bidder for 
the owner.
The findings of this study reveal that the improved 
model provides a different ranking of bidders than the one 
obtained by the model in Polat et al. (2019). The ranking 
Fig. 1: Comparison of the ranking of bidders according to the previous model developed by Polat et al. (2019) and the current model.
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of the bidders according to the final scores is presented in 
Figure 1.
As seen in Figure 1, the improved unbalanced bid 
detection model provides a different ranking of bidders 
than the one obtained by Polat et al.’s (2019) model. For 
instance, while Bidder 8 (B8) ranked first and Bidder 2 (B2) 
ranked second according to the previous model, Bidder 2 
(B2) ranked first and Bidder 8 (B8) ranked second accord-
ing to the proposed improved model. The main reason 
behind this variation is the addition of new grading 
systems and the changes in the weights assigned to the 
grading systems.
5  Conclusions
Unbalanced bidding is one of the most important prob-
lems for owners in the construction industry. Not only 
does it create an environment of unfair competition but 
also increases the project cost, considering the time value 
of money. If owners detect unbalancing when evaluating 
bids, they have the right to disqualify the unbalanced 
bids. Since the bidder who offers the lowest bid price is 
predominantly awarded the project and the unit price of 
each bid item is usually not taken into consideration, it 
is not an easy task for owners to detect the existence of 
unbalancing. Moreover, it is more difficult for owners to 
detect materially unbalanced bids (i.e., quantity error 
exploitation) when compared with the mathemati-
cally unbalanced ones (front-end loading and back-end 
loading). A fairer competition environment can be created 
as long as the owners are armed with a tool that can help 
them in detecting unbalanced bids easily.
The main aim of this study was to propose an improved 
version of the unbalanced bid detection model developed 
by Polat et al. (2019). The proposed model uses eight 
different grading systems. Owners may assign different 
weights to these grading systems according to the charac-
teristics of their projects. After assigning weights to each 
grading system, the final scores of bidders can be calcu-
lated. All bidders can be evaluated not only according to 
the offered bid prices but also according to the calculated 
final scores. While the submitted bid with the highest final 
score indicates that it is the most balanced one, the sub-
mitted bid with the lowest final score indicates that it is 
the most unbalanced one. This study highly recommends 
the owners to consider not only the submitted bid price 
but also the balance score of the bidders when evaluating 
the bids, in order to shield themselves from the potential 
problems arising from unbalanced bids.
An illustrative example is also presented to vali-
date the applicability of the proposed model. It has been 
observed that the improved model can not only detect 
unbalanced bids but also provide a different ranking of 
bidders than the one obtained by the model of Polat et 
al. (2019). However, this study is limited by the fact that 
it only focuses on materially unbalanced bids in unit price 
contracts. In future studies, the model can be further 
developed so that it can also deal with the detection of 
mathematically unbalanced bids.
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